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LIBERTY OF THE HIGHER-ORDER WILL: 
FRANKFURT AND AUGUSTINE 1 
John J. Davenport 
In Augustine's early account of good and evil (in On Free Choice of the Will), and 
in his story of his own moral struggles (in the Confessions) we find a view similar 
to Harry Frankfurt's account of the first and second orders of the will. However, 
while Frankfurt thinks that his hierarchical account of the will provides evidence 
against the libertarian principle (PAP) that alternative possibilities are required 
for a person to be morally responsible for her actions, Augustine's account shows 
that this is not so. Rather, Augustine holds that moral responsibility for our char-
acter as constituted by our volitional identifications requires alternative possibili-
ties of the higher-order will. Such 'liberty of identification' can be required even 
if we reject PAP as a condition on responsibility for outward acts. I explain this 
in terms of a tracing-defense of a restricted Hbertarianism based on a principle of 
responsibility for character, and I compare the resulting model with Robert 
Kane's conception of ultimate responsibility. After responding to Frankfurt's 
objection that the order-asymmetry in such a model is implausible or unmotivat-
ed, I argue that such a model is immune from traditional or non-global 
Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP-type principles. 
In two famous articles, Harry Frankfurt developed and defended the com-
paiibilist position that alternate possibilities of action are not required for 
moral responsibility.2 Yet, as I will argue, Frankfurt's analysis of the will is 
closely related to St. Augustine's early work, which is the main classical 
source of the libertarian doctrine that a morally responsible agent must be 
able to do or will otherwise than she did. While Frankfurt's ideas about 
autonomy can help in understanding Augustine, Augustine's early posi-
tion on good, evil, and responsibility for character also poses a unique chal-
lenge to Frankfurt's views on the freedom required for moral responsibili-
ty. This challenge has not been widely recognized in the burgeoning litera-
ture influenced by and responding to Frankfurt's insights/ but it forms a 
powerful version of what I have recently called the "tracing defense" of 
alternative-possibility requirements for moral responsibility: Developing 
these implications shows that Augustine's early account offers a novel lib-
ertarian corrective to Frankfurt's model. 
1. Frankfurt's Hierarchical Model of the Will 
Harry Frankfurt's main debt to the Augustinian tradition is found in his 
volitionalist account of personhood, which was developed in response to 
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mid-20th-century theories that reduced personhood to a combination of 
consciousness, rational judgment, and embodiment. In response to Peter 
Strawson in particular, in his 1971 paper, "The Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person," Frankfurt argued that persons are distinguished 
from other animals by their capacity for what he calls "second-order voli-
tions." He defined an agent's first-order will as "the desire (or desires) by 
which he is motivated in some action he performs or ... the desires by which 
he will or would be motivated if or when he acts" (p.14).5 To clarify this, 
we may say that a first-order motive in general is a subjective mental state 
that inclines the agent to some act which does not have mental states of the 
agent herself as its end or goal. In other words, first-order motives are out-
wardly directed practical attitudes, aimed at ends external to the agent's 
psyche. In contrast, Frankfurt explains that a second-order volition is the 
will to act on one kind of first-order motive rather than another. As 
Frankfurt first formulated it, a second-order volition is the will to have a 
certain first-order desire be the effective motive if or when one acts (p.1S). 
Thus if we think of this 'effective motive' more specifically as the maxim or 
intention in terms of which an agent free from self-deception would under-
stand her own behavior as an act, then a second-order volition can also be 
understood as the will to be moved to one kind of intentional act as 
opposed to others, or to adopt one kind of maxim for action. More gener-
ally, second-order volitions are reflexive in nature: they aim at an end or 
goal that concerns the agent's own first-order motivational states. 
Frankfurt believes that such higher-order volitions explain the phenome-
non which he famously calls identifying with a motive, or with a kind of 
character. "Identification," in its special Frankfurtian volitional sense, refers 
to the intrapersonal experience of striving to become one kind of person 
rather than another: it involves working on the social self or outward charac-
ter that one presents to the world. The person who identifies with a motive 
or reason for acting in a particular way experiences this motive as her own, 
or as authored by her. As opposed to a "wanton" who (like non-human 
animals) "does not care about his will" (p.16), someone who is a "person" in 
the full sense has second-order volitions and is therefore not neutral or 
unconcerned about the will on which she acts. Rather, she identifies with one 
desire over others as the one she wants to be her first-order will. Frankfurt 
gives as an example an "unwilling addict" who "identifies himself, 
... through the formation of a second-order volition" with the desire to 
refrain from taking drugs, even though he still acts on his craving for the 
drugs (p.18). Thus, on this account, identifying with a first-order motive, 
and in the process "alienating" other conflicting first-order desires on which 
one might act, both occur through the formation of second-order volitions.6 
This analysis leads Frankfurt to two important conclusions. (1) In vari-
ous circumstances, the first-order will that is constitutive of the act (i.e. the 
motive or maxim that gives the act its intentional meaning) may involve an 
intention with which we do not identify in the deeper personal sense, an 
intention that our inward self rejects in its second-order volitions. (2) And 
when we identify with the first-order motive on which we act, it need not 
be agent-caused for us to be morally responsible for our action. Frankfurt 
illustrates the second point by contrasting the unwilling addict with a 
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"willing addict." While the former is "helplessly violated by his own 
desires," and therefore presumably has diminished moral responsibility 
for his act (like someone acting intentionally but under duress), the latter 
willingly identifies with his irresistible craving for heroin, and is thus fully 
responsible for his action even though the addiction may have begun by 
accident, and now he cannot act otherwise: 
His [first-order] will is outside his control, but by his second-order 
desire that his desire for the drug should be effective, he has made 
this will his own (p.25). 
Thus identification with the first-order will WI that is causally operative in 
our behavior (making that behavior an action) is sufficient for moral 
responsibility for our action, even though the higher-order volition may 
not have caused the act or brought it about that WI was the motive on which 
we acted. 
Frankfurt regards the willing addict and similar "over-determination" 
cases as counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities" 
(PAP), different versions of which say (simplifying somewhat) that an 
agent is responsible for some X (a decision, intention, act or consequence) 
only if he had the power to bring about some significant alternative to X. 
Frankfurt's rejection of Augustinian liberum arbitrium as a condition for 
moral responsibility has led to a considerable and ongoing debate in recent 
literature focusing on whether Frankfurt-cases constitute real counterex-
amples to various possible versions of PAP, and if so, whether they also 
prove that responsibility is compatible with complete psychophysical 
determinism (in which all relevant future events are entailed by the laws of 
nature together with the past). But this debate has largely overlooked a 
crucial point that Augustine's ideas illustrate: the hierarchical analysis of 
volition by itself is still compatible with a libertarian account of the condi-
tions of moral responsibility. The merits of this combination have not been 
fully explored, but deserve serious consideration. 
II. Augustine's Hierarchical Conception of Good and Evil in the Will 
Although he conceives the faculty somewhat differently than Frankfurt, 
Augustine also considers our will to be the distinguishing feature of 
human personhood, and he regards the agent's will as the center of her 
individual identity. In his De Libera Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will), 
Augustine insists that the person's seifis most closely or authentically iden-
tified with his will: "If the will by which I choose or refuse things is not 
mine, then I don't know what I can call mine."7 Frankfurt's account of 
autonomy, which developed from his hierarchical analysis of the will, also 
requires that acts of volitional identification count as expressions of the 
agent's true self: unlike first-order motives, which can persist even when 
they are rejected by the higher-order will, the agent eo ipso identifies with 
the reflexive process or state of will that identifies him with a first-order 
motive. In other words, higher-order volitions are inalienable as long as 
they constitute identifications." 
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Likewise, while Augustine never uses the language of second-order 
volitions, the notion is implicit in his early analysis of good and evil. In 
Book I of On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine focuses on the motives 
behind immoral actions, arguing that "evildoing" is always motivated by a 
perverse or "inordinate desire" for temporal or worldly goods whose pos-
session depends partly on chance and fortune, i.e. "things that cannot be 
possessed without fear of losing them."9 In other words, Augustine holds 
that evildoing consists in acting on a certain unrestrained form of 'first-
order will,' namely one that desires material and social goods to an inordi-
nate degree, or even at the cost of unjust harm to others. to Thus when 
Augustine argues later that "only the will and free choice can make the 
mind a companion of cupidity" or inordinate desires,l! he is implying that 
we begin to act on such desires only because we freely accept or identify 
with them: whether we are reflectively aware of this or not, we will that an 
inordinate desire become the first-order intention on which we act. 
Augustine believes that we form higher-order volitions through which we 
actively help to shape our operative motives, accepting or even cultivating 
the motivational force that certain desires have for us, while resisting or 
working to break down the motivational force of other incentives. 
This becomes particularly clear in the third book of On Free Choice of the 
Will, when Augustine's student Evodius asks "why that nature sinned which 
God foresaw would sin" and adds that he wants more than the explanation 
that it sins by free choice, since he is "looking for the cause of the will itself."12 
Augustine first responds that the search for such a cause would lead to an 
infinite regress, and so choice of one option over others cannot have any suf-
ficient or determining cause outside the will itself.13 But Evodius's question 
can be understood not as asking for such an external explanation, but rather 
as seeking some account of the motive internal to the evil higher-order will, 
or the basis for the choice(s) through which inordinate desires become our 
dominant motives. Augustine eventually faces this deeper question when 
he considers the relation between will and reason. He says: 
Only something that is seen can incite the will to act. We control 
whether we accept or reject whatever we see, but we do not control 
what we see. Therefore, we must acknowledge that the soul as a 
rational substance sees both superior and inferior things; from either 
class it chooses what it wills ... 14 
The will must have objects or ends that it does not create. So it might seem 
that the evil will just chooses to pursue the lower goods as if they had an 
absolute value, even when pursuit of them conflicts with the higher goods. 
Yet why would anyone willingly choose what they perceive to be the lesser 
good, especially if they did not already desire it inordinately, as Augustine 
believes must have been the case with Adam before the fall, or with the 
Devil before his fall? At this level, what we need is some account of the 
motive or basis of the higher-order volition to desire the inferior goods 
unconditionally, or even at the cost of eternal goods of the soul. 
Augustine's final answer is that the object of this evil higher-order voli-
tion is the agent's own self. Adam identifies with desire for the temporal 
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goods out of a "pride that turns one away from wisdom .... And what is the 
source of this turning away, if not that someone whose good is God wants 
to be his own good, as if he were his own God."!S Likewise, Satan's rebel-
lion involves willing to put himself in God's place, and what first suggests 
this to him is his mind's perception that he is a different being than God.!6 
Here it is clear that an evil will involves more than simply inordinate first-
order desire for temporal goods. At least in first sin, it must also involves 
the higher-order volition to reject divine authority, or to overvalue lesser 
goods just because we want to determine for ourselves which goods are 
more or less valuable independently of God's will and law. Thus evil 
begins in rebellious obstinacy and pride in the higher-order wilp7 
The same notion of a higher-order volition standing above our given 
first-order motives is implicit in Augustine's later accounts of moral psy-
chology, where he argues that memory, understanding, and will are capa-
ble of applying reflexively to one another and to themselves: 
... For I remember that I have memory, and understanding, and will; 
and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I 
will that I will, and remember, and lmderstand ... !8 
In Free Choice of the Will, the related claim that nothing "is so much in the 
power of the will as the will itself"'Y occurs in the context of an argument 
that "it is up to our own will" whether or not we enjoy a "good will." 
Augustine defines a good will as one "by which we desire to live upright 
and honorable lives and to attain the highest wisdom."20 Like the evil will, 
the good will so conceived involves higher-order volitions. It does not just 
consist in acting on ordinate first-order desires (which we might call 'good-
doing' as the opposite of evil-doing). Rather, the good will involves the 
second-order volition that identifies with ordinateness of our proper first-
order motives. The good person endorses and works to cultivate such 
motives because of their goodness. The inward state of moral uprightness 
or rectitudo of will in the Augustinian tradition -which was reinterpreted 
by Kant as "the motive of duty"- thus consists in a form of second-order 
volition that responds to a moral judgment about the worth of different 
sorts of first-order motive.21 
These examples show that for Augustine, moral worth depends primarily on 
the state of our higher-order will: although everyone naturally has "the will to 
be happy" and thus desires goods that appear likely to contribute to their 
well-being, good or morally worthy persons are distinguished by "the will to 
live rightly,"n or their rectitude in willing to act only on desires that are neither 
unjust nor inappropriate in the situation.23 Likewise, an evil will requires voli-
tional identification with perverse first-order motives; it is the second-order 
will in which "someone chooses to descend from the heights of wisdom and 
become a slave to inordinate desires." 24 Thus Augustine's conception of 
"wilt" as opposed to mere bodily action, is like higher-order volition in 
Frankfurt's sense: it is a reflexive commitment to being a particular kind of 
character, or to becoming a particular sort of person.25 
We see this even more clearly in Augustine's famous description of his 
struggles with himself in the Confessions. For example, in recounting his 
442 Faith and Philosophy 
desire to follow Victorinus's example and commit himself to the Christian 
God, Augustine writes: 
... but I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon me by another, but 
by my own will, which had the strength of iron chains. The enemy 
held my will in his power and from it he had made a chain and shack-
led me. For my will was perverse and lust had grown from it, and 
when I gave in to lust habit was born, and when I did not resist the 
habit it became a necessity ... But the new will which had come to life in 
me and made me wish to serve you freely and enjoy you, my God, 
who are our only certain joy, was not yet strong enough to overcome 
the old, hardened as it was by the passage of time. So these two wills 
within me, one old, one new, one the servant of the flesh, the other of 
the spirit, were in conflict, and between them they tore my soul 
apart....In this warfare, I was on both sides, but I took the part of that 
which I approved in myself rather than the part of that which I disapproved. 
For my true self was no longer on the side of which I disapproved, since to a 
great extent, I was now its reluctant victim, rather than its willing toof.26 
In this passage, up to the italicized point, the description suggests two 
opposed forces of the same kind, or two states on a metaphysical par with 
one another, although the older one is more entrenched. But in the itali-
cized portion this changes, and the description suggests that above these 
two desires stands a higher-order volition representing Augustine himself, 
by which he identifies with the kind of motive that he judges to be morally 
superior. Yet, as in some of Frankfurt's examples, this second-order voli-
tion does not immediately cause him to act on ordinate rather than concu-
piscent first-order desires. So, in language that clearly anticipates 
Frankfurt's, Augustine then describes himself as the "victim" of this habit-
ual disposition that controls his acts, although he no longer identifies with 
it. As we see later, this is partly because his new second-order volition 
itself is not yet entirely "wholehearted;" it is not yet a decisive commit-
ment. 27 Eleonore Stump recognizes the same halfheartedness in 
Augustine's infamous prayer that God make him chaste, "but not yet." As 
she suggests, we can regard sincere prayer for a change in motive as an 
expression of the agent's higher-order volition. When such a prayer)s less 
than wholehearted, it is because the higher-order will remains weak. 6 
Since good and evil wills involve contrasting states of higher-order voli-
tion for Augustine, the freedom to tum from a good will towards and evil 
will, and visa-versa, ultimately resides in the power to form volitional iden-
tifications. When Augustine says that it is "up to us" whether we have a 
good will, this implies a requirement of alternative possibilities for the high-
er-order will itself. Thus he says, "If the movement of the will were not vol-
untary and under its own control, a person would not deserve praise for 
turning to higher things or blame for turning to lower things, as if swinging 
on the hinge of the will."29 This hinge metaphor clearly indicates a libertari-
an freedom (in the proper alternative-possibilities sense)30 which explains 
the human will's 'intermediate' nature between good and evil. Since the 
inner character of this will that turns us towards higher or lower things is 
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constituted by our higher-order volitions, our responsibility for the charac-
ter of our will requires the liberty to form different volitional identifications 
or reflexive commitments themselves. The moral worth and/or culpability 
of "character" in this sense must be distinguished from mere praise or 
blame for particular outward actions. The good will is a great or infinite 
good according to Augustine's criteria precisely because its liberty saves the 
person's inner character from being determined by fate or fortune alone: 
their good second-order will "cannot be stolen or taken away from them 
against their will."31 This will cannot be determined by any "natural" neces-
sity if it is to be culpable when it identifies with inordinate desires.32 
It is important to emphasize that such a libertarian account of volitional 
identification does not imply that the past has no effect on what options are 
open to the agent's higher-order wilt or on how easily she may change her 
current volitional commitments. Just as our habits of first-order motivation 
may be tough to change, different possible higher-order volitions may be 
more or less difficult for an agent to establish in herself. Augustine's account 
does not require that the agent's alternatives in the higher-order will are 
unlimited, but it does imply that a higher-order volition -as exemplified in 
an upright will or an evil will- is never necessitated but rather remains one 
among a morally significant range of alternative possible identifications that 
are more or less accessible to us. Although the process through which one 
of these live options becomes actual is not determined by past choices and 
external causes,33 it may still be inclined or conditioned by such factors. 34 
Thus, while Augustine's account benefits from Frankfurtian clarification, it 
also requires its own unique and subtle version of libertarian freedom. 
In sum, I have attributed to the early Augustine a version of libertarian-
ism according to which liberum arbitrium in the higher-order will is essen-
tial to responsibility for our character first of all, and derivatively for our 
particular actions. This is a development of the traditional interpretation of 
Augustine's view. For example, explaining the distinction between liberum 
arbitrium and libertas or "higher freedom," Vernon Bourke writes: 
The former is a part of man's created nature: the soul is endowed at 
birth with the ability to tum towards or away from its supreme good; 
this ability is liberum arbitriwn. It implies a freedom of alternatives: to 
do what is good or what is evil. On the other hand, God may so dis-
pose the human will that it inclines only toward its true good. This 
divine disposition would free the will from its tendency toward evil; 
such eminent freedom is libertas.35 
To this I have added Augustine's implicit recognition of liberum arbitrium 
in the higher-order will. However, both Augustine's understanding of 
grace and predestination, and his attempted answer to the dilemma of 
freedom and divine foreknowledge, naturally raise questions about 
whether it is right to attribute such a libertarian theory to Augustine. For 
example, David Hunt has argued that already in On Free Choice of the Will, 
Augustine endorses a conception of divine foreknowledge that makes our 
future choices temporally necessary, rejecting libertarian freedom as a 
requirement for moral responsibility.36 Since the main goal of this article is 
444 Faith and Philosophy 
to assess the challenge that a hierarchical libertarianism poses for 
Frankfurt's account, for the moment I will simply assume that I have 
described Augustine's early view correctly. But I hope to address these 
important historical and exegetical questions in a planned follow-up arti-
cle. 
III. Freedom of the Will and Liberty of Identification 
Like the early Augustine, in his first paper on the higher-order will, 
Frankfurt considered the liberty to form different second-order volitions or 
to change one's identifications to be part of "freedom of the will," which he 
distinguishes from "freedom of action." But unlike Augustine, Frankfurt 
never thought that moral responsibility requires a "free will" in his sense. 
Instead, he gives a detailed compatibilist account of freedom of action, 
which he thinks is sufficient for an agent to be responsible for a particular 
act. Roughly speaking, an agent exhibits "freedom of action" in 
Frankfurt's sense if he does what he wants (no impediment blocks his first-
order motive from causing the intended act) and he does not have an 
opposing second-order volition (i.e. he does not identify with an opposite 
or incompatible first-order desire). By contrast, "When we ask whether a 
person's will is free we are not asking whether he is in a position to trans-
late his first-order desires into actions" (p.20). While freedom of action 
concerns the relation of the first-order will to the behavior it tries to guide, 
"freedom of the will" concerns the relation of second-order volitions to the 
first-order motives with which they identify the agent. The primary condi-
tion for a free will is that her second-order volitions V2 are successful, or 
bring it about that she acts upon the motives1 with which she identifies 
through V2 (p.20). For instance, consider someone who acts out of nasti-
ness towards a relative when he willsz to act of out kindness instead (p.22). 
Because he is not moved by the sympathetic intention with which he iden-
tifies, "he finds himself a helpless or passive bystander to the forces that 
move him," and thus he does not have a free will (p.22). 
Free will in Frankfurt's sense requires more than just that the agent's 
second-order volition agrees with his operative first-order desires, for in 
cases like the willing addict "their coincidence is not his own doing but 
only a happy chance" (p.20). Altering my example, suppose that just 
before he meets his relative, our man finds a $100 bill; as a result, he is so 
happy that his urge to be cruel to his relative dissipates. He will surely still 
be somewhat disappointed with himself afterwards, since he knows that, 
but for his lucky find, he would have been nasty against his true willz. In 
an agent exercising free will, the agreement between higher and lower-
order will is not so dependent on luck. 
Although he leaves this ambiguous in some passages, Frankfurt also 
implies that freedom of the will requires more than just a hypothetical rela-
tion between acts of volitional identification and the agent's first-order 
motives. Suppose that if agent S forms a higher-order volition V2 identify-
ing with desire n, then it will successfully guide S to act on n. This is not 
enough to ensure that S enjoys free will. If it were, then S could enjoy free 
will without actually forming any second-order volitions, as long as they 
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would be effective if formed. Then arguably even a wanton who lacked 
the mental capacity to identify with first-order motives could exhibit free 
will, as long as there was some logically possible world in which the wan-
ton has enhanced mental capacities, would use them to form second-order 
volitions, and these volitions would be effective in guiding his first-order 
will?7 But Frankfurt insists that a wanton can neither have nor lack free-
dom of will in his sense -it cannot even be an issue for the wanton (p.21). 
Thus freedom of the will requires more than hypothetical effectiveness of 
possible higher-order volitions. The agent with free will must also have it 
presently in her power to form higher-order volitions, a capacity that the 
wanton lacks. Thus Frankfurt says: 
A person's will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants. This 
means that, with regard to any of his [first-order] desires, he is free 
either to make that desire his [first-order] will or to make some other 
desire his [first-order] will instead. Whatever his [first-order] will, 
then, the will of the person whose will is free could have been otherwise; 
he could have done otherwise than to constitute his [first-order] will 
as he did (p.24, my italics). 
Frankfurt focuses here on the availability of alternatives at the first-order 
level, but the free-willed agent realizes these alternatives through her high-
er-order will. Her liberty to make either first-order desire OJa or OJb her 
willI must then derive from her capacity to form either the volition V2a 
identifying with Ola, or to form the volition V2b identifying with 01b.38 
Thus free will in Frankfurt's sense includes libertarian freedom to bring 
about different higher-order volitions, or to change our identifications.39 
Let us call this special condition 'liberty of the higher-order will' or the 
'freedom to identify otherwise.' A person enjoys this liberty when, without 
requiring other changes in their present state as a precondition, he can form 
anyone out of a significant range of possible higher-order volitions (or 
identifications). Note that this higher-order liberty could be enjoyed by 
itself, without the other condition involved in Frankfurtian freedom of the 
wilL For example, although no crack-cocaine addict in the grip of compul-
sive desires enjoys Frankfurtian free will (since in the present, circum-
stances permitting, they will act on their craving for cocaine whether they 
identify with it or not) they could still enjoy liberty of the higher-order will. 
An addict enjoying such 'liberty of identification' is one who can make her-
self either a willing or an unwilling addict: although her will, is not free, since 
she cannot actually refrain from acting on the addictive desire, she can 
either identify with this desire or alienate it (by committing herself to 
oppose it and trying to find ways to overcome it). Again, these alternatives 
may not be equally available to the agent, but she has more or less liberty in 
the higher-order will depending on the range of second-order volitions 
open to her, and how easy or difficult they may be to form. 
Now this sort of scenario in which an agent enjoys liberty of identifica-
tion but lacks full freedom of the will is familiar from Augustine's influen-
tial account of the bondage of sin. Admittedly, Augustine did not always 
clearly separate this liberty of the higher-order will from the ability to be 
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free from inordinate desire in our first-order will. Thus when he argues 
that "the mind must be more powerful than cupidity"40 and so must be 
able to resist acting on inordinate desire, Augustine gives the appearance 
of clashing with Frankfurt's modern view that an unwilling addict, for 
example, can actually be coerced by physiological need to desire a drug. 
Yet in his own account of the volitional state of "difficulty" that results 
from first sin, Augustine in fact cites many similar experiences where we 
are "held back by some sort of necessity of carnal desire" which prevents 
us from acting on the very motives! that we wilh to act on.4! To experience 
this as volitional difficulty, however, we have to be able to decide for our-
selves not to consent to or identify with these inordinate desires: though our 
higher-order will may be too weak to control which desires we act on, we 
still control our higher-order will. 
Because for Augustine we can be responsible not only for acquiring a 
good will but also for first sin ---or the initial turning away from God that 
subjects us to later volitional difficulties- the range of alternative possible 
higher-order volitions that we can form must (at least initially) be a moral-
ly rich one. Significant freedom of the will must include the ability to iden-
tify with either ethically appropriate or unethical motives for acting. Thus 
Augustine argues that the human will is originally in a "state intermediate 
between wisdom and folly" and able to move itself in either direction; only 
for this reason is the person's whole character subject to moral categories.42 
Moreover, Augustine takes on faith that it was by an original exercise of 
this capacity to sin that we lost a stronger power of the will: 
But to accept falsehoods as truths, thus erring unwillingly; to struggle 
against the pain of carnal bondage and not be able to refrain from acts 
of inordinate desire: these do not belong to the nature that human 
beings were created with .... [W]hen we speak of the free will to act 
rightly, we mean the will which human beings were created withY 
In paradise, human beings would have had something like full freedom of 
the will in Frankfurt's sense, enabling them to exercise complete control 
over the first-order motives on which they act. But this ability is lost 
through an initial sin in the higher-order will itself. Nevertheless, every 
human being still retains the residual freedom, or higher-order liberty, to 
turn back to God,+! or to identify with morally upright motives for action 
because they are ordinat~ven if this inward rectitudo cannot effectively 
control our fallen first-order wills without divine assistance. 
IV. Moral Responsibility for Character: Augustine's Challenge to Frankfurt 
In light of these similarities between Augustine and Frankfurt, it becomes 
clear why Augustine's early account of the conditions of moral responsibility 
poses an important challenge to Frankfurt. Frankfurt holds that neither "free 
will" in his sense nor liberty of the higher-order will alone are necessary for 
responsibility for one's actions, while Augustine (at least in his earlier works) 
holds that liberty of the higher-order will is required. Like Frankfurt, 
Augustine traces responsibility for outward actions to responsibility for 
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higher-order volitions that identify us with the motives of those acts, but 
unlike Frankfurt, Augustine thinks that liberty of identification is necessary 
for us to be responsible for these higher-order volitions themselves. 
As we saw, Augustine'S account (as I interpreted it) implies that we 
have the liberty to identify either with good (or ordinate) desires or with 
inordinate desires as the motives of our actions. Identifying with the for-
mer is a state of moral virtue while identifying with inordinate desire is the 
original form of moral corruption, on Augustine's account. In other words, 
Augustine links liberty of identification in the higher-order will with the 
initial dual capacity for both moral worth and unworth in one's personality. 
Liberty of identification is an original condition of moral responsibility for 
one's inward volitional character, i.e. the character formed by long-term com-
mitments or patterns in the higher-order will itself. 1his is to be distin-
guished from outward character, which consists in dispositions to act on var-
ious kinds of first-order motives, along with other familiar personality-
traits. The unwilling alcoholic, for example, may have what psychologists 
call an 'addictive personality' in her outward character, but her inner char-
acter is formed in part by her commitment to self-reform. 
According to Augustine, then, the moral worth of persons (as opposed to 
the isolated values of their particular actions) depends directly on the 
inward character made up of their enduring volitional identifications. The 
unwilling addict, for example, has at least a residual virtue that the wanton 
addict lacks.45 But if the moral worth of our inner character is determined 
by our persistent higher-order volitions (or our enduring pattern of commit-
ments), then the higher-order will itself must enjoy some measure of liber-
tarian freedom in forming these volitions: our identifications can count as 
self-determined or as our own only if we could have identified otherwise. 
Of course, Frankfurt and his philosophical heirs have distinguished self-
determination and libertarian freedom (in its proper sense as dual volun-
tary control over multiple alternatives). But the Augustinian model insists 
that these features converge at the highest level of the will, where it locates 
ultimate responsibility, even if they can diverge at the more derivative lev-
els of human agency. 
Frankfurt agrees with Augustine that one acquires a volitional self for 
which one is responsible precisely through authentic commitment to vari-
ous desires or possible first-order motives. Thus the willing and unwilling 
addict differ in their moral worth because of the difference in the value of 
their volitional identifications. In a later paper, Frankfurt says that the per-
son's self is constituted by the choices of higher-order will through which 
she tries to form a coherent and stable volitional character: by incorporat-
ing some preference-rankings and radically rejecting others, we "create a 
self out of the raw materials of inner life."46 The early Augustine's position 
is similar. But because Frankfurt did not focus on the role identification 
plays in determining the self's moral worth, he did not initially ask if the 
agent had to be able to wilh otherwise when forming a higher-order voli-
tion for it to count as self-determined, or to constihlte an authentic identifi-
cation.47 Yet in a series of more recent papers, Frankfurt has explicitly 
argued that we may be bound by what he calls "volitional necessities" in 
which we cannot avoid some of the higher-order cares and commitments 
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that define our true self.4B In his view, we are still responsible for these 
decisive or wholehearted identifications, although it may have been 
inevitable that we would develop them. Furthermore, responsibility for 
these self-constituting commitments does not require the ability to change 
them even indirectly: it may rather be volitionally impossible for us even to 
question them, let alone to set out intentionally to change them. On this 
view, such necessary identifications still count as self-determined because 
they are expressions of our individual nature or personal essence. 
By contrast, in On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine implicitly rejects any 
such notion of a personal essence: he insists that because our volitional 
identifications determine our moral worth, they must be generated 
through a process in which the agent could have willed2 otherwise. Let us 
call this the principle of alternative possibilities for inner character: 
P AP-C. Moral responsibility for one's inner character requires liberty 
of identification at the higher levels of the will, or in the capacity to 
form the volitional commitments that define our deep self: the agent 
is responsible for her higher-order volitions only if she could (at some 
point in her past) have voluntarily formed other volitions at these 
levels or voluntarily avoided her present identifications. 
Although Augustine certainly offers no decisive proof of PAP-C, I think 
this principle has strong intuitive appeal: most people's considered convic-
tions will agree with PAP-C unless they are given strong reasons to alter 
this intuition. But Frankfurt has not yet given us any such reasons to reject 
PAP-C, although he and his followers have challenged other PAP-type 
principles for actions, omissions, and their consequences. 
The Tracing Defense of PAP-Co In general, the Frankfurtians have 
employed several famous over-determination examples to argue that 
agents can be responsible for something X (an action, its consequences, a 
prior intention, or perhaps a decision) when they have brought X about 
without interference, even though they could not have done otherwise.'9 I 
have argued in a recent review of Fischer and Ravizza's book that the intu-
itive appeal of all such cases depends on a distinction between two ele-
ments: "one (R) which explains why the agent is responsible for X, and 
another (1) which explains why X is inevitable," or why X could not have 
been avoided.oo In such cases, R intuitively makes the agent responsible for 
X even though X is inevitable, but only because we tacitly assume that the 
agent meets whatever conditions are required to be responsible for R itself. I 
would now add that, if it is to be plausible to everyone that the agent is 
responsible for X, then (1) the R and I factors must not only separated, but 
(2) distinguished in such a way that it is open to the audience to take the R-fac-
tor as avoidable or evitable. As a result, libertarians can respond to such cases 
with what I call a tracing defense: they can say that in order to be responsible 
for R, the agent had to be able to avoid R, and thus responsibility for X still 
ultimately requires libertarian freedom. Any attempt to answer such a 
tracing defense with revised over-determination examples will require 
cases in which both the R and X-element are inevitable, and the libertarian 
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can hold that the agent is not responsible in such cases. For in such cases, 
the agent will be responsible not only in the actual sequence, but also in the 
counterfactual sequence, where R is caused by the external i-factor. Thus 
although Frankfurt-style examples may show that responsibility and 
inevitability can be locally compatible, for the libertarian, this is possible 
only because of the libertarian freedom which the agent enjoyed in bring-
ing about the conditions that made her responsible for the X-element in the 
case, even though X is inevitable due to quite separate i-conditions. 
We can apply this pattern of analysis to Frankfurt's willing heroin addict 
case. In this example, X is the taking of heroin, i is the physiological addic-
tion or compulsive disorder that makes refraining from available heroin vir-
tually impossible, and R is the agent's identification with his addictive crav-
ing, or his second-order will to remain an addict. The willing addict indeed 
seems responsible for taking his heroin, even though he could not do other-
wise. This intuition depends on the plausible assumption that he is respon-
sible for his second-order volition itself. Given the structure of this case, 
Frankfurt must make this assumption, but he cannot defend or analyze its 
conditions within the example: rather, it must be presupposed for the example 
to seem persuasive.51 Moreover, the plausibility of the assumption that the 
addict is responsible for his higher-order volition requires that we can 
regard it as avoidable. So if the willing addict seems responsible for his 
higher-order will, and thus for taking the drug, isn't that because we tacitly 
imagine this addict as having liberty of identification, and thus as having 
the volitional possibility of becoming an unwilling addict instead? Certainly 
the early Augustine thought that, with God's help, he could have worked 
this change in himself. I have found that undergraduates to whom I pose 
the case routinely imagine the addict as freely deciding to identify with his 
addictive desires rather than to alienate and fight them, and when ques-
tioned, they cite this presupposition in explaining their judgment that the 
addict's willingness makes him responsible for taking the drug. If instead 
we stipulate that the addict has been progmmmed to identify with and culti-
vate his cravings, or that he never had any other alternative higher-order 
volition open to him, many people will find that their initial inclination to 
hold him responsible for his addictive behavior evaporates. Because now 
the R and X factors are both inevitable, and we cannot trace the agent's 
responsibility for R to any prior condition R* which the agent did not 
inevitably satisfy, we are no longer sure that the agent is responsible. 
Rather, under these specifications, we doubt that his putative higher-order 
volition is really the agent's own, or truly self-determined, or really express-
es the volitional identifications constitutive of a deep self. 
Let me clarify that this tracing model is only meant to be a defense of 
PAP-C against familiar over-determination counterexamples to PAP-princi-
ples. It does not attempt to demonstrate on any independent grounds that 
P AP-C is correct. Rather, it only seeks to show that, given their structure, 
traditional over-determination cases leave libertarians free to hold P AP-C. I 
have not attempted here to answer objections to P AP-C that do not rely on 
Frankfurt-style cases,52 or to refute any rival compatibilist accounts of 
responsibility for our volitional identifications (for example, Frankfurt's 
neo-Leibnizian notion of personal essences, or Fischer and Ravizza's actual-
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sequence account of "takilJ~ responsibility" for the psychological processes 
that explain our actions). Those antecedently disposed to prefer such 
semi-compatibilist accounts will have to ask themselves how much their 
disposition depends on the judgment that traditional Frankfurt-style cases 
are clear defeaters of PAP-type principles, for my argument does under-
mine this judgment. But I provide no direct defeaters of the semi-compati-
bilist theories here.54 Rather, I have only argued that PAP-C cannot be 
defeated by traditional over-determination cases. 
Comparison to Kane's Analysis. It is important to note that the extension 
of libertarian conditions on moral freedom by tracing principles has 
already been pioneered by Robert Kane. Kane's theory is a highly sophisti-
cated development of Aristotle's earliest tracing theory: "if a man is 
responsible for wicked acts issuing from his character, then he must at 
some time in the past have been responsible for forming this character," 
where such responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise in choices 
that helped create this character. 55 In particular, Kane adds to the alterna-
tive-possibilities requirement what he calls the "condition of ultimate 
responsibility, or UR."56 Kane's UR is a complex tracing version of PAP: 
the first part (R) defines "personal responsibility" for an event or state as 
requiring that the agent could have avoided something that causally con-
tributed to the event or state, and the second part (U) says that 
for every X and Y (where X and Y represent occurrences of events or 
states) if the agent is personally responsible for X, and if Y is an arche 
(or sufficient ground or cause or explanation) for X, then the agent 
must also be personally responsible for y's7 
UR embodies one kind of libertarian tracing theory, because it entails "that 
some actions in an agent's life history must satisfy AP" (the condition of 
alternative possibilities), although not every free and responsible act must 
satisfy AP,5R and its ultimacy condition requires that the agent be responsi-
ble for any actualized sufficient condition of any act imputable to him. The 
idea is clearly that responsibility for some X traces to responsibility for any 
actual state of affairs sufficient for X.S9 
This is obviously somewhat different from the tracing defense I have 
sketched above, since my defense does not require that if the agent is 
responsible for some action A, then she is responsible for all actualized suf-
ficient conditions for A, including the obtaining of any condition that 
makes A inevitable.60 Rather, it traces responsibility for inevitable actions 
and decisions to states of the higher-order will, which Kane would include 
in our character. Thus my tracing approach can be used directly against 
traditional (non-global) Frankfurt-style cases, whereas Kane's principle is 
not tailored specifically for this purpose. Hence in The Significance of Free 
Will, Kane does not argue that in traditional counterfactual-intervener 
examples, the agent is responsible for an X which he also cannot avoid, yet 
only because this responsibility ultimately traces to a libertarian source. 
While his restricted libertarian theory of ultimate responsibility certainly 
encourages such a move, Kane sees that it does not as obviously answer 
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global Frankfurt-style cases. Instead he argues, like Carl Ginet and David 
Widerker, that in cases in which the actual sequence is indeterministic (so 
as not to beg the question against incompatibilists), the agent can avoid the 
X for which she is responsible. In particular, the indeterministic choices in 
which ultimate responsibility terminates cannot be rendered inevitable by 
a Frankfurt-controller.61 
But this Ginet-Kane-Widerker approach has been challenged by several 
new cases, including Eleonore Stump's argument that "any mental act, 
even an act of willing, is correlated with a neural state which is not indivis-
ible," although earlier portions of this neural sequence do not cause the 
act. 62 Although Stewart Goetz and others have attempted to answer 
Stump, I think it may be better and more powerful to begin with the trac-
ing defense against traditional Frankfurt-style cases, and then to see 
whether the sort of restricted libertarianism it implies can then shed light 
on what is wrong in the global cases.63 
However, the forms of restricted libertarianism consistent with my trac-
ing defense will be similar to Kane's in many respects. In place of Kane's 
(U) they would have the requirement that to be responsible for X, we must 
be ultimately responsible for whatever conditions are sufficient for us to be 
responsible for X. In place of Kane's (R), they would have the thesis that 
ultimate responsibility for some state S, which is not traceable to prior 
responsibility for anything else, requires being able voluntarily to avoid S. 
When spelled out, these models will also entail Kane's conclusion that if 
ultimate responsibility must terminate in some state that is undeniably 
attributable to us, or by its very nature imputable to us, only a state originat-
ing from libertarian choice with dual or plural volLmtary control can satisfy 
this condition. The Augustinian model I sketched above is one especially 
appealing version of such a restricted libertarianism, since it involves the 
transfer of responsibility via higher-order volitions, by which we may 
become responsible even for actions that we could not avoid causing.64 
V. A Rejoinder to Frankfurt 
In his response to a much earlier and shorter conference version of this 
essay, Frankfurt asked why we should think that the conditions of respon-
sibility for inner character should be any different than the conditions of 
responsibility for particular actions. Surely, he said, it is "far more reason-
able to presume that the basic structural conditions for moral responsibility 
are the same in every type of case."65 So if we can be responsible for acting 
on a given first-order desire even when we cannot do or desire, otherwise, 
then likewise, we can probably be responsible for a volitional identification 
formed in the higher-order will even when we could not wilb otherwise. 
Frankfurt's suggestion is that there is a natural analogy between responsi-
bility for these different elements of agency: If so, then such hierarchical or 
order-symmetry would be the natural presumption. Thus by contrast, 
hierarchical asymmetry in any theory of moral responsibility will be ad hoc, 
unless that theory can give us special new reasons to think (against our 
alleged natural presumption) that asymmetry is the best explanation of 
available evidence. 
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The libertarian rejoinder to this argument should now be evident. Even 
on Frankfurt's own view, the conditions of responsibility for particular out-
ward (or non-reflexive) acts and responsibility for volitional identification 
are not structurally similar, because responsibility for outward actions 
traces (at least in part) to responsibility for volitional character and for the 
reflexive activities that constitute it. The hierarchical asymmetry in the 
Augustinian model builds on this crucial structural distinction: in this 
model, (1) responsibility for a particular outward act may exist even when 
the act is inevitable, but only because the responsibility flows from a higher-
order volition through which the agent identifies with that act. Yet (2) 
responsibility for volitional identification itself does not trace to other psy-
chic states or processes with their own distinct conditions of imputability, 
since this is where 'the buck stops.' This is just to say that the higher-order 
will (or some part of it) is a source of ultimate responsibility in Kane's 
sense. (3) Hence inevitability and responsibility cannot be made compati-
ble for the higher-order will in the way they are rendered compatible at the 
level of outward actions and their first-order motives. (4) Finally, note that 
we could add further tracing conditions at this level, if we think that suffi-
cient persistence in our higher-order volitions or sufficient commitment of 
the will can 'fix' our identifications or make them impossible for us to 
change in the future. 66 Of course, this does not show that compatibilists 
cannot offer competing accounts of responsibility for volitional identifica-
tions. But it does show that the order-asymmetry of the early Augustinian 
theory is hardly ad hoc, since it is just a specific instantiation of the structur-
al asymmetry that we must find in any tracing theory (including compati-
bilist ones) between conditions of local responsibility for elements covered 
by tracing principles, and conditions of ultimate responsibility for those 
final elements to which all responsibility traces. Nor is the burden of proof 
on libertarians to demonstrate that the hierarchical asymmetry permitted 
by PAP-C is better than any conceivable compatibilist explanation of our 
experience and our moral concepts. Rather, we only have to show that 
hierarchical asymmetry has a clear and logical rationale in the elegant 
structure of an unrefuted theory with a respectable historical pedigree, 
which for most people will sufficiently explain all the relevant available 
evidence. We have made some progress in showing this much. 
Pace Frankfurt, then, its hierarchical asymmetry is not by itself any prima 
facie evidence against the liberty of identification model. Hence the tracing 
libertarian can safely hold that, although examples like the willing addict 
show that responsibility may be locally compatible with inevitability for 
outward actions, this does not apply by analogy to the very volitional iden-
tifications that make such local compatibility possible. To think that we 
can simply generalize from such local compatibility is to miss the insight of 
the tracing theory that there is a crucial disanalogy between levels of the 
will: if a person is responsible for acting on inordinate desires even when 
they cannot do otherwise, but only because the person was committed to 
these first-order dispositions by her higher-order volitions, then this still 
leaves an open question about the conditions of responsibility for these voli-
tions themselves. Plausible Frankfurt-style cases necessarily accommodate 
the fact that ultimate responsibility for the most central activities of human 
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agency can have conditions quite different from the conditions of deriva-
tive responsibility for lower elements of our agency. 
Moreover, starting from the libertarian intuition embodied in PAP-C, we 
should expect to find another closely related asymmetry: even if the actual 
causal history of the first-order motive that explains an action may not always 
by itself determine the agent's responsibility for that action (e.g. if the agent 
identifies with a motive derived from external causes), yet the causal history 
of higher-order volitions may well be crucial in determining the conditions 
of responsibility for volitional identifications themselves. How such voli-
tions are formed in the higher-order will may be essential to their special sig-
nificance as carriers of the agent's identification. Since agents are by defini-
tion responsible for their volitional identifications, such a volitional attitude 
may not count as an identification (or as a self-determined expression of our 
long-term goals, ends, and values) unless it has the right kind of causal histo-
ry, e.g. perhaps being brought about by a process of practical reasoning 
involving libertarian choice or agent-causation, or some other incompatibilist 
moment. 
If the hierarchical tracing model with its order-asymmetry is established 
as an intelligible option that embodies P AP-C, we might ask why rival 
compatibilist accounts of responsibility for the higher-order will should 
still have any appeal, even if incompatibilists cannot find decisive defeaters 
for them? Since today the fear that future physics could describe our 
world as a deterministic system seems rather remote (especially given the 
successes of Superstring Theory) I think the compatibilist accounts will 
seem forced unless their defenders can actually refute P AP-C. For exam-
ple, without such a refutation, why would we accept, as Frankfurt has 
asserted, that a person can be programmed to form the identifications he 
does, thus taking responsibility for various desires even though he could 
not have done otherwise than to identify with them or take responsibility 
for them?67 In his response to my paper, Frankfurt reiterated this thesis: 
Whatever mental acts are required to accomplish the acceptance in 
which identification consists, a person may be morally responsible 
for performing those acts even if he could not have done otherwise 
than to perform them. There is no reason why it should be any more 
essential for an agent to have alternatives to these acts [which consti-
tute an identification], in order to be morally responsible for them, 
than it is essential for morally responsible agents to have alternatives 
to acts of other sorts.68 
But, given my above analysis, I do not see how Frankfurt could try to con-
vince anybody to agree with this assertion if (like most people) they start 
with the presumption that P AP-C is correct. Again, I do not attempt here 
to demonstrate that Frankfurt's assertion is incorrect, but I have shown 
that he is wrong to think that his examples against familiar unrestricted 
PAP-principles legitimize any presumption that P AP-C is probably also 
false. Traditional (non-global) Frankfurt-style cases neither falsify PAP-C 
nor ground the least doubt of its truth. And since for most people, the 
presumption remains on the side of P AP-C unless it can be refuted, the 
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burden of argument is thus on Frankfurtians to provide quite different 
counterexamples against PAP-C itself. 
In that effort they will face the following dilemma: (1) either their coun-
terexample will depend on highly controversial inevitability-making con-
ditions to ensure that the agent identifies as she does in the actual scenario, 
such as hard knowledge of what an agent's future decisions will be,69 or (2) 
it will no longer preserve the difference between the R factors in the actual 
sequence that make the agent responsible for her identification, and the I 
factors that render it inevitable, in such a way that responsibility for R can 
be avoided. In the latter case, I have argued that libertarians need not 
grant the fundamental premise in traditional counterexamples to PAP, 
namely that the agent remains responsible for her activity. 
A final example may help to clarify this problem for Frankfurtians.. The 
film Leaving Las Vegas features Benjamin, a willing addict (played by 
Nicholas Cage), and while we pity him, most viewers probably blame him 
for identifying with his alcoholism.70 But would we feel the same if we 
were told that Benjamin could not have done otherwise, because if he had 
not decided to quit his job and throw himself unreservedly into pursuit of 
death through drink, a counterfactual intervener would have made him 
form the higher-order volition expressed in these decisions? Call this case 
FY (for Frankfurtian-Vegas). Since the counterfactual intervener played no 
role in the actual sequence, should we say that in FY, Benjamin is responsi-
ble for his higher-order will, because he formed it on his own? Perhaps 
this will seem plausible until we ask: how does this differ from the inter-
vener's causing him to form his volitional identification, as would happen if 
Benjamin failed to form it by a certain time, or began before then to tum 
towards becoming an unwilling addict? 
As Fischer and others have repeatedly emphasized in rejoinder to flicker-
of-freedom defenses of PAP, in traditional Frankfurt-style cases, there is an 
important asymmetry between the actual and counterfactual sequences: the 
agent is /lot responsible for what she does in the counterfactual sequence, 
because it does not amount to an action at all (instead, it is an unintentional 
movement).?! Even in cases where the countedactual intervener supposedly 
causes a decision or an intention to act, the 'action' in the counterfactual 
sequence is still not voluntary, and the Frankfurtian cannot not hold the 
agent responsible for it without begging the question against incompatibil-
ism. But now, in FY, we are supposed to imagine that the counterfactual 
intervener will cause a state of volitional identification to arise in our agent. 
According to the tracing theory, and Frankfurt himself, the agent is eo ipso 
responsible for any such state of his inner character: this must be the case for 
responsibility to transfer through this state to other first-order motives. So 
FY asks us to imagine that an intervener can cause the very same state for 
which the agent is responsible in the actual sequence. Thus in FV, the 
required asymmetry between actual and counterfactual sequences is lost: in 
both, Benjamin must be responsible for his higher-order volition. As a result, 
FY simply begs the question against the incompatibilist. So the Augustinian 
tracing-defender need not countenance that FY is even a possible scenario. 
Thus anyone beginning from PAP-C and then reflecting on these cases 
would be justified in concluding that in a scenario in which we can no longer 
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trace the compulsive agent's responsibility to a volitional commitment or 
identification that he could have voluntarily avoided, it would be unfair to 
consider him responsible for his fate. 
If some non-philosopher NP (whose intuitions aren't shaped by explicit 
prior theoretical baggage) still did feel inclined to blame Benjamin for identi-
fying with alcoholism, even though a counterfactual intervener was standing 
by to make Benjamin so identify, NP's attitude would probably be due to her 
tacit assumption that in the counterfactual sequence, the artificially created 
second-order desire to cultivate alcoholic cravings would not count as the 
agent's own, or as an identification for which he has taken responsibility. In 
other words, NP would be reinterpreting the FV case so that in the counter-
factual sequence, Benjamin only acquires some simulacrum of volitional iden-
tification with his desire for alcohol. In this alternative version of FV, the 
intervener cannot really make Benjamin into a willing addict without his 
consent. In this form, FV would include the required asymmetry between 
actual and counterfactual sequences, and thus would not beg the question 
against incompatibilists. But in this form, FV also leaves P AP-C intact. For 
now Benjamin can voluntarily avoid identifying with his alcoholism by 
deciding on his own not to identify with it in the counterfactual sequence. 
VI. Conclusion 
So far, it seems that the tracing version of restricted libertarianism resists tra-
ditional Frankfurtian counterarguments. But two important questions 
remain to be addressed. First, do Augustine's mature or final views about 
freedom, Christian justification, and the human relationship with God 
undermine the sort of theory I've sketched here? In a sequel to this paper, I 
hope to defend the thesis that, while Augustine did change his views follow-
ing the Pelegian controversy, his own earlier approach remains superior. 
Second, quite apart from theological concerns, can the proponent of restrict-
ed libertarianism extend the tracing defense of PAP-C to so-called 'global' 
Frankfurt-style cases, in which the agent never had the power to do other-
wise at any point in the past, but still apparently acted without outside inter-
ference in the actual sequence? There are now several kinds of these cases, 
some of which involve complex problems. But the present paper has at least 
shown that to be fully global, such cases will have to include the higher-order 
will. Yet as we have seen, if the higher-order will is made inevitable by some 
series of interveners, then they must have the power to cause an agent to 
form a volitional state for which she is necessarily responsible, a state such 
that responsibility is essentially built into it. And it is hard to see how this 
could be stipulated without begging the main question that will divide liber-
tarians and non-libertarians over P AP-c. 
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